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ABSTRACT
We consider the automatic verification of information flow secu-
rity policies of web-based workflows, such as conference submis-
sion systems like EasyChair. Our workflow description language
allows for loops, non-deterministic choice, and an unbounded num-
ber of participating agents. e information flow policies are spec-
ified in a temporal logic for hyperproperties. We show that the ver-
ification problem can be reduced to the satisfiability of a formula
of first-order linear-time temporal logic, and provide decidability
results for relevant classes of workflows and specifications. We re-
port on experimental results obtained with an implementation of
our approach on a series of benchmarks.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Web-based workflow systems oen have critical information flow
policies. For example, in a conference management system like
EasyChair, the information about a certain paper must be kept se-
cret from all program commiee (PC) members who have declared
a conflict of interest for the paper until the acceptance notifications
are released by the PC chair.
Verification techniques for workflows (cf. [4, 16, 21]) typically
build on classic notions of secrecy such as non-interference [17].
e particular challenge with verifying web-based workflow sys-
tems is that here is no fixed set of agents participating in the work-
flow. Clearly, we would not like to reason about the correctness of
a conference management system for every concrete installation
for a particular conference, a particular program commiee and a
particular set of submissions and reports. Instead, we would like to
prove a given system once for all — for any possible instantiation
and any number of PC members, submied papers and reports.
We present such a verification approach based on the temporal
logic HyperLTL [9]. HyperLTL is a general specification language
for temporal hyperproperties, which include common information
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flow policies like non-interference, and time- and data-dependent
declassification. HyperLTL can also express assumptions on the
behavior of the agents such as causality, i.e. that an agent can
only reveal information that was received by the agent at a previ-
ous point in time. is is important in order to analyze chains of
information flows, where a piece of information is transmied via
two or more communications, i.e. where agent A learns about a
secret known to agent B, even though B never communicates with
A directly; instead, B talks to a third agent C, and, subsequently, C
talks to A.
HyperLTL-based workflow verification has been considered be-
fore, but only for the restricted case of loop-free workflows [16].
Such workflows consist of a fixed finite sequence of steps. Al-
though an arbitrary number of agents may participate in each step,
the workflow thus only allows a fixed number of interactions be-
tween the agents. is is not realistic: to accurately model, for ex-
ample, the repeated commenting on papers and reviews during the
discussion phase of a conference management system, one needs
a loop in the workflow.
We present an automatic verification technique for workflows
with loops. e general outline of our approach is as follows: We
specify the operational semantics of theworkflow language inmany-
sorted first-order linear-time temporal logic (FOLTL). e desired
information-flow policy and the assumptions on the agents are
expressed in first-order HyperLTL (HyperFOLTL). Combining the
two specifications, the existence of a violation of the policy reduces
to the satisfiability of a HyperFOLTL formula.
We identify an expressive fragment ofmany-sortedHyperFOLTL,
for which satisfiability is decidable. e fragment subsumes the
previously known decidable fragments of FOLTL [22] and of Hy-
perLTL [15]. It also generalizes the Bernays-Scho¨nfinkel fragment
of first-order logic [1]. Of particular practical value is that our logic
is many-sorted, i.e. we distinguish different groups of agents such
as authors and program commiee members. is allows us to
place different assumptions on different groups; it also improves
the performance of our decision procedure, because the different
sorts are kept separate.
We identify a natural class of workflows, which we call non-
omiing workflows, where the encoding of the verification prob-
lem is in the decidable fragment of HyperFOLTL. We thus obtain a
decision procedure for non-omiing workflows. is decidability
result in fact turns out to be optimal in the sense that for workflows
outside the class, non-interference becomes undecidable. e de-
cidable fragment is also sufficiently expressive to specify common
information-flow policies like non-interference. In terms of agent
assumptions, we show that the fragment is sufficiently expressive
to handle strong assumptions like stubbornness, meaning that an
agent does not reveal any information, for arbitrary sets of agents,
and weaker assumptions, like causality, for a fixed finite set of
agents. is means that we can decide whether a given number of
agents can conspire to cause a leak, assuming that all other agents
do not reveal any information. Again, our decidability result is
optimal in the sense that the verification problem for unbounded
sets of causal agents turns out to be undecidable: it is impossible
to decide whether an unbounded number of agents can conspire
to reveal a secret.
We report on experimental results based on an implementation
of our approach in the tool NIWO. For example, NIWO has found
an aack on a simple conference management system, where two
program commiee members conspire to leak a secret.
2 PRELIMINARIES
Given a sequence σ¯ , we let σn denote its n-th element, and σ¯ [n,∞]
denote its subsequence from n to ∞, i.e. σ¯ [n,∞] := σnσn+1 . . .,
assuming σ¯ is infinite. We sometimes abuse notation and use set
notation over sequences. For instance, |σ¯ | denotes the length of σ¯ .
2.1 First-Order LTL (FOLTL)
A signature Σ = (S,C,R, ar) consists of a non-empty and finite set
of sorts, finite and disjoint sets C and R of constant and relation
(or predicate) symbols, and arity function ar : C ∪ R → S∗, with
|ar(c)| = 1 for any c ∈ C, where S∗ denotes the set of finite se-
quences of sorts. For each sort s , we letVs be a countably infinite
set of variables. We letV :=
⋃
s ∈S Vs .
FOLTL formulas over the signature Σ = (S,C,R, ar) are given
by the grammar
φ ::= t = t ′ | R(t1, . . . , tk ) | ¬φ | φ ∨ φ | ∃x : s .φ | Xφ | φ Uφ
where t , t ′, and the ti s range over V ∪ C, R ranges over R , s
ranges over S , and x ranges over Vs . e symbols X and U de-
note the usual Next and Until LTL operators. As syntactic sugar,
we use standard Boolean connectives such as ∧,→,↔, the uni-
versal quantifier ∀x , and the derived temporal operators F (Even-
tually) with Fφ := trueUφ, G (Globally) with Gφ := ¬ F¬φ, W
(Weak Until) with φWψ := (φ Uψ ) ∨ Gφ, and R (Release) with
φ Rψ := ¬(¬φ U¬ψ ), where true := (c = c) for some c ∈ C.
We only consider well-sorted formulas. We omit their definition,
which is as expected; for instance, equality is only allowed over
terms of the same sort. We may drop the sort in ∀x : s .φ when it is
irrelevant or clear from the context and simply write ∀x . φ.
We will sometimes consider that formulas are in negation nor-
mal form, which is obtained by pushing negation inside until it
appears only in front of atomic formulas. When considering this
form, the operators ∧, ∀, and R are seen as primitives, instead of
derived ones. A formula is in prenex normal form if it is wrien as
a sequence of quantifiers followed by a quantifier-free part.
To omit parentheses, we assume that Boolean connectives bind
stronger than temporal connectives, and unary connectives bind
stronger than binary ones, except for the quantifiers, which bind
weaker than Boolean ones and stronger than temporal ones.
e set of free variables of a formula φ, that is, those that are
not in the scope of some quantifier in φ, is denoted by fv(φ). A
formulawithout free variables is called closed or ground. For a term
t ∈ V ∪ C, we let fv(t) := {t} if t ∈ V and fv(t) := ∅ otherwise.
A structure S over the signature Σ = (S,C,R, ar) consists of a S-
indexed family of (finite or infinite) universes Us , ∅ and interpre-
tations RS ∈ Us1 × . . .Usk , for each R ∈ C ∪ R of sort (s1, . . . , sk ).
We let U :=
⋃
s ∈S Us . A temporal structure over Σ is a sequence
S¯ = (S0,S1, . . . ) of structures over Σ such that all structures Si ,
with i ≥ 0, have the same universe family, denoted (Us )s ∈S , and
rigid constant interpretations, i.e. cSi = cS0 , for all c ∈ C and
i > 0.
Given a structure, a valuation is a mapping ν : V → U with x
and ν (x) of the same sort for any x ∈ V . For a valuation ν and
tuples x¯ = (x1, . . . , xn ) and d¯ = (d1, . . . ,dn), where xi ∈ Vs and
di ∈ Us for some sort s , for each i , we write ν [x¯ 7→ d¯] for the
valuation that maps each xi to di and leaves the other variables’
valuation unaltered. By ν (x¯)we denote the tuple (ν (x1), . . . ,ν (xn)).
We extend this notation by applying a valuation ν also to constant
symbols c ∈ C, with ν (c) = cS .
Let S¯ be a temporal structure over the signature Σ, with S¯ =
(S0,S1, . . . ), φ a formula over Σ, and ν a valuation. We define the
relation S¯,ν |= φ inductively as follows:
S¯,ν |= t = t ′ iff ν (t) = ν (t ′)
S¯,ν |= R(t¯ ) iff ν (t¯) ∈ RS0
S¯,ν |= ¬ψ iff S¯,ν 6 |= ψ
S¯,ν |= ψ ∨ψ ′ iff S¯,ν |= ψ or S¯, ν |= ψ ′
S¯,ν |= ∃x .ψ iff S¯,ν [x 7→ d] |= ψ , for some d ∈ U
S¯,ν |= Xψ iff S¯[1,∞],ν |= ψ
S¯,ν |= ψ Uψ ′ iff for some j ≥ 0, S¯[j,∞],ν |= ψ ′, and
S¯[k,∞],ν |= ψ , for all k with 0 ≤ k < j
A FOLTL formulaφ is said to be satisfiable iff there exists a tem-
poral structure S¯ and a valuation ν s.t. S¯, ν |= φ. It is said to be
finitely satisfiable iff there exists a temporal structure S¯ over a fi-
nite universe U and a valuation ν s.t. S¯,ν |= φ.
We note that unsorted FOLTL can be seen as sorted FOLTL with
just one sort.
2.2 FOLTL Decidability
Since FOLTL subsumes First-Order Logic (FOL), FOLTL is also un-
decidable. In this paper, we consider formulas of a Bernays-Scho¨nfinkel-
like fragment1 of FOLTL, which we name ∃∗FOLTL. To define
this fragment we will consider the projection of a sorted FOLTL
formula on a sort s , defined as the FOLTL formula obtained by re-
moving all quantifications and terms of a sort different from s . We
refer to [1, Definition 17] for the formal definition of the projection,
and here we only illustrate it with an example. Given the formula
∃x :A. ∀y:B. ∃z:A.¬(x = z) ∧ P(x,y) ∧ GQ(y,z), its projection on
the sortsA andB are the formulas∃x . ∃z.¬(x = z)∧P2(x)∧GQ1(z)
and ∀y. P1(y) ∧ GQ2(y), respectively.
e ∃∗FOLTL fragment of sorted FOLTL consists of those closed
formulas φ in negation normal form such that, for each sort s , the
projection of φ on s is a formula of the form
∃x1, . . . ,xk .φ
′
s
1e Bernays-Scho¨nfinkel-Ramsey fragment, also called “effectively propositional”,
is one of the first identified decidable fragments of FOL [8]. It consists of those FOL
formulas in prenex normal form having the ∃∗∀∗ quantifier prefix.
with k ≥ 0 and φ′s a FOLTL formula containing no existential
quantifiers. is definition extends the definition of the Bernays-
Scho¨nfinkel-like fragments in [1, 27] from FOL to FOLTL,2 and
of the Bernays-Scho¨nfinkel-like fragment in [22] from unsorted
FOLTL to sorted FOLTL. Note that the previous sample formula is
in ∃∗FOLTL.
We can try to put an arbitrary FOLTL formula in the mentioned
form by using the standard transformations that put a FOL formula
into prenex normal form, as well as the following equivalences to
move existential quantifiers outside of temporal operators:
φ U∃x .ψ ≡ ∃x . (φ Uψ ) and (∃x .ψ )Rφ ≡ ∃x . (ψ Rφ),
assuming that x does not occur free inφ. Note that in particular we
have that F∃x .φ ≡ ∃x . Fφ. However, the previous equivalences
cannot be generalized. For instance, existential quantifiers can-
not, in general, be moved over the G operator. Intuitively, G∃x .φ
means that “for all time points t , there exists an x such that φ holds
at t”. us, in contrast to FOL, not all FOLTL formulas can be put
in prenex normal form.
Theorem 2.1 (∃∗FOLTL Decidability).
(1) Checking satisfiability of a formula in ∃∗FOLTL is equiva-
lent to checking finite satisfiability of the same formula.
(2) ∃∗FOLTL is decidable.
Proof. is proof follows the reasoning for decidability of the
Bernays-Scho¨nfinkel-Ramsey fragment of FOL, see e.g. [8].
Consider a closed formula φ in ∃∗FOLTL. e formula φ has
the form Q1x1: s1 . . .Qkxk : sk .ψ , where k ≥ 0, Q1, . . . ,Qk is a
sequence of quantifiers, and ψ is an FOLTL formula in negation
normal form containing no existential quantifiers. We group the
sequence Q1, . . . ,Qk of quantifiers into maximal subsequences of
the form ∃∗∀∗. We let n be the number of such subsequences, and
let ψi be obtained from φ be removing the first i groups of quanti-
fiers, for 0 ≤ i ≤ n. Note that φ0 = φ and φn = ψ .
We iteratively transform the formula φ0 into the formulas ψ1
to ψn . We also build the sets D
i
s of constant symbols of sort s ,
for each sort s and each i with 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Consider step i , with
1 ≤ i ≤ n. For each sort s , we pick a set Cis of constant symbols
whose cardinality is given by the number of existential quantifiers
over the sort s in the i-th subsequence, and such that Cis ∩C
j
s = ∅
for any 0 < j < i . We let Dis = C
i
s ∪ D
i−1
s , where D
0
s is a single-
ton containing some constant of sort s . For each sort s , and each
variable x of sort s bound by an existential quantifier from the i-th
group, we remove the existential quantifier and we instantiate x
in ψi by a corresponding constant from C
i
s . In this way, all exis-
tentially quantified variables in ψi are instantiated. Next, starting
from the top-most universal quantifier inψi , we iteratively replace
every subformula of the form∀y: s .α by the finite conjunction over
elements ofDis , namely,
∧
d ∈D is
α[y 7→ d]. Letψi+1 be the formula
obtained in this manner. Finally, we replace all subformulas of the
form ∀y: s .α in ψn (recall that ψ may have universal quantifiers)
by the finite conjunction over elements of Dns , as above. Let ψ
′ be
the formula obtained in this manner. It is easy to see that φ is sat-
isfiable iff ψ ′ is satisfiable. Furthermore, it is also clear that ψ ′ is
2e decidable FOL fragments in [1, 27] are larger than the projection of the ∃∗FOLTL
fragment to sorted FOL, as they also consider function symbols.
satisfiable iff it is finitely satisfiable, as we can pickUs = D
n
s as the
(Herbrand) universes. Note that by construction the universe Us
is non-empty even when there is no existential quantifier over the
sort s ; in this case Cis = ∅, for all i with 1 ≤ i ≤ n. is ends the
proof of the first statement of the theorem.
For the second statement of the theorem, note thatψ ′ contains
neither quantifiers, nor variables, and thus its atoms are ground.
We transform ψ ′ into an LTL formula by taking the disjunction
over all combinations of equivalence relations over Dns (for each
sort s) of the formulas obtained by replacing each predicateR(d1, . . . ,dℓ)
inψ ′ with the atomic propositions R(d ′1, ...,d
′
ℓ
), where d
′
i is the rep-
resentative of the equivalence class to which di belongs. Further-
more, equalities a = b are replaced by true if a and b are in the
same equivalence class and by false otherwise. Clearly, the thus
obtained formula is equi-satisfiable withψ ′. We can now conclude
by noting that LTL satisfiability is decidable, see e.g. [29]. 
We also note that there are very few decidability results con-
cerning FOLTL. Besides the ∃∗FOLTL fragment, the only other de-
cidable fragment we are aware of is the monodic fragment [18],
which requires that temporal subformulas have at most one free
variable. As will become clear in the next section, this restriction
is too strong for our purposes: we cannot encode workflows by
FOLTL formulas in this fragment.
3 WORKFLOWS
In this section, we will define a language of workflows. Our defini-
tion of workflows extends the definition of workflows in [16] with
loops and nondeterministic choice.
Workflows are used to model the interactions of multiple agents
with a system. Agent interactions are recorded by relations. Up-
dates of these relations are organized into blocks. ese describe
operations that a subset of the agents can choose to execute to
change the relation contents. e most basic construct in the de-
scription of workflows is a parameterized guarded update opera-
tion to some relation. Such an update is meant to simultaneously
be executed for all tuples satisfying the given guard. Some of these
updates may also be optional, i.e. may also be omied for some of
the tuples that satisfy the guard.
Example 3.1. eworkflow in Fig. 1 models the paper reviewing
and review updating of EasyChair. In this workflow, all PC mem-
bers are agents. In a first step, they can declare that they have a
conflict of interest with some of the papers. en, papers are as-
signed to reviewers as long as they have not declared a conflict
with the respective papers. Reviewers are then required to write
an initial review of their assigned papers. Aerwards, the discus-
sion phase starts. Here, all reviewers of a paper are shown all the
reviews other peoplewrote for the same paper. ey can then alter
their review based on the information they have seen. is discus-
sion phase continues for multiple turns until the PC chair ends the
phase.
3.1 Workflow Language
Workflows are defined over signatures Σ = (S,C,R, ar), with R =
Rwf ⊎Rhigh. Symbols in Rwf denote workflow relations, which are
updatable. Symbols in Rhigh denote non-updatable relations that
% PC members may declare conflicts
(b1) forall x :A,p: P may. true → Conf += (x,p)
% PC members are assigned to papers
(b2) forall x :A,p: P may.¬Conf(x,p) → Assign += (x,p)
% PC members write reviews for papers
(b3) forall x :A,p: P , r :R.
Assign(x,p) ∧ Oracle(x,p, r ) → Review += (x,p, r )
% PC members discuss about the papers
loop (*) {
% PC members read all other reviews
(b4) forall x :A,y:A,p: P , r :R.
Assign(x,p) ∧ Review(y,p, r ) → Read += (x,y,p, r )
% PC members can rethink their reviews
(b5) forall x :A,p: P , r :R may.
Assign(x,p) ∧ Oracle(x,p, r ) → Review += (x,p, r ) }
Figure 1: EasyChair-like workflow.
w ::= block | block w
| loop (*) {w } | choose w or w
block ::= forall x1: s1, . . . ,xk : sk . stmts
| forall x1: s1, . . . ,xk : sk . may stmts
stmts ::= stmt | stmt; stmts
stmt ::= θ → R += (u1, . . . ,un)
| θ → R −= (u1, . . . ,un)
Figure 2: Definition of Workflows
contain high input (i.e. input containing potentially confidential
data) to the workflow. For instance, in Example 3.1 we have Rwf =
{Conf,Assign, Review, Read} and Rhigh = {Oracle}.
Workflows w over a signature Σ = (S,C,R, ar) are defined by
the grammar given in Figure 2, where s1, . . . , sk with k ≥ 0 range
over sorts in S , xi ranges over variables inVsi for each i ,u1, . . . ,un
with n ≥ 0 range over terms in V ∪ C, R ranges over predicate
symbols in R , and θ ranges over first-order formulas over the sig-
nature Σ. For a statement θ → R ±= u¯, we require that R ∈ Rwf ,
|u¯ | = |ar(R)|, and fv(θ)∪ fv(u¯) ⊆ x¯ , where x¯ is the sequence of vari-
ables appearing in the forall construct of the block that contains
the statement. We only consider well-sorted workflows.
3.2 Semantics
Wewill now give the semantics of workflows directly using FOLTL.
Formalization of the control flow. Given a workflow w , we
consider its control flow graph (CFG), defined as expected. We add
a node nend to the CFG with only a single, looping, outgoing edge,
encoding a fictitious new last block that can be reached aer the
original last block of the workflow. is new node is used to en-
code a finite (terminated) execution of the workflow by an infinite
trace, where the last workflow state is stuered. Any infinite path
through the graph represents thus an execution of the workflow.
n0 n1 n2 n3
n4
nend
b1 b2 b3
b4b5
id
id
Figure 3: CFG of the workflow in Example 3.1.
All edges are labelledwith blocks. Note that for each block there
is a unique edge that is labeled with that block. Edges not corre-
sponding to a workflow block are labeled with a distinguished la-
bel id, which is assumed to represent an empty block without vari-
ables and statements. As an illustration of the CFGs we consider,
Fig. 3 depicts the CFG of the workflow in Example 3.1.
Let (V ,E) be the CFG of workflow w . We abuse notation, and
we use the proposition (i.e. nullary predicate) n to express whether
the workflow is in node n ∈ V . We denote by Rcfg the set of these
predicate symbols. e transition relation of the workflow is then
expressed by the formula:
cfg(w) := G
( ∧
n∈V
n → X (
∨
n′∈succ(n)
n′)
)
where succ(n) is the set of the successors of the node n in the CFG.
Furthermore, the workflow can never be in two states at once:
sanity(w) := G
( ∧
n,n′∈V ,n,n′
¬(n ∧ n′)
)
Workflow loops can but need not terminate, and thus the same
holds for workflow executions. A terminating behavior could be
imposed by requiring that the node nend is eventually reached, us-
ing the formula Fnend . We do not impose this requirement.
Initial state. Every workflow executes sequentially, thus start-
ing at node n0 of the workflows CFG, where n0 is the entry point
in the CFG. ere all relations in Rwf are empty. Formally, this
initial condition is expressed by the following formula:
init(w) :=
(
n0 ∧
∧
n∈V \{n0 }
¬n
)
∧
∧
R∈Rwf
∀y¯. ¬R(y¯)
Block execution. ebasic step of ourworkflow language, which
determines the transition from the current time point to the next
time point, is the execution of one block. As in [16], we formal-
ize this execution by characterizing with an FOLTL formula the
interpretation of a predicate at the next time point based on the
interpretation of the relations at the current time point.
For every block b and every relation symbol R ∈ Rwf , we con-
struct a formulaΦb,R (y¯) so thatR(y¯) holds aer execution of blockb
iff Φb,R(y¯) holds before the execution of b , with |y¯ | = |ar(R)|. e
semantics of a block is then represented by the following formula:
execw (b) := (n ∧ Xn
′) →
∧
R∈Rwf
(
∀y¯.(XR(y¯)) ↔ Φb,R (y¯)
)
where (n,n′) ∈ E is the edge in the CFG with label b .
For defining the formulas Φb,R , we consider first amay block b ,
of the form forall x¯ : s¯ may stmts. We assume, for simplicity, that
each R ∈ Rwf is updated at most once in a block (i.e. it occurs at
most once in a statement of block b on the right-hand side of→).
For each R ∈ Rwf , we let Φb,R(y¯) :=
R(y¯) if R not updated
R(y¯) ∨ ∃x¯ : s¯ . θ ∧ Choicei (x¯) ∧ (y¯ = u¯) if u¯ added to R
R(y¯) ∧ ¬
(
∃x¯ : s¯ . θ ∧ Choicei (x¯) ∧ (y¯ = u¯)
)
if u¯ deleted from R
where block b’s statement that updates R has the form θ → R±=u¯,
i is the index of the blockb in the linearisation of the workflow, and
it is assumed that x¯ ∩ y¯ = ∅. e definition of Φb,R when b is a
non-may block is similar, except that the Choicei (x¯) conjuncts are
omied.
If the same relation is modifiedmultiple times in a block, the up-
dates take place sequentially. is is expressed by building the for-
mulas Φb,R inductively, similarly as above: Φb,R up to statement j
is obtained by replacing R(y¯) with Φb,R up to statement j − 1. We
omit the precise formalization.
We denote by Rlow the Choicei predicate symbols used in the
Φb,R formulas. ese symbols denote relations that contain low
input (i.e. non-confidential input) to the workflow. For instance, in
Example 3.1 we have Rlow = {Choice1,Choice2,Choice5}.
e semantics of the workflow execution is then captured by
the following formula:
exec(w) := G
∧
b ∈blocks(w )
execw (b).
where blocks(w) is the set ofw’s blocks.
Example 3.2. e execution semantics of the block (b2) of the
workflow from Example 3.1 is given by the following formula:
(n1 ∧ Xn2) →(
∀y1,y2. XAssign(y1,y2) ↔ Assign(y1,y2) ∨
(∃x,p. Choice1(x,p) ∧ ¬Conf(x,p) ∧ y1 = x ∧ y2 = p)
)
∧(
∀y1,y2. XConf(y1,y2) ↔ Conf(y1,y2)
)
∧ . . .
e first conjunct of the above consequent can be rewrien into
the logically equivalent formula
∀x,p. XAssign(x,p) ↔ Assign(x,p) ∨ Choice1(x,p) ∧ ¬Conf(x,p)
by substituting x and p by y1 and y2 respectively, and then renam-
ing y1 and y2 back to x and p. We note that this formula matches
well the syntax of the block (b2). ementioned simplification can-
not be performed in general, but only for a class of workflows, see
Section 3.3.
We note that a forall x¯ may block with statements of the form
θi → Ri ±= u¯i , can be seen as an abbreviation of a non-may
block with statements of the form Choice(x¯) ∧ θi → Ri ±= u¯i ,
for some predicate symbol Choice < Rwf . Note also that for an
atomOracle(t¯ ) occurring in some guard θi , the arity ofOracle need
not be |x¯ |. We use the abbreviatedmay form to emphasize the sub-
tle differences between the two kinds of non-workflow relations.
Summary. e complete specification wf(w) of the workflow
is a conjunction of the several parts described previously — the
control flow graph, the initial state, and the semantics of the tran-
sitions between time points.
wf(w) := cfg(w) ∧ sanity(w) ∧ init(w) ∧ exec(w)
Note that the formula wf(w) is expressed over the signature Σ′
obtained from Σ by extending it with relation symbols n ∈ Rcfg
and Choicei ∈ Rlow .
For any given workfloww over a signature Σ, its semantics JwK
consists of all temporal structures S¯ over Σ′ that satisfy wf(w). A
workfloww satisfies a closed FOLTL formula φ, denotedw |= φ, iff
S¯,ν |= φ for any S¯ ∈ JwK, and any valuation ν . We have:
Theorem 3.3. Given a workflow w , a FOLTL formula φw can be
built in polynomial time so that for every FOLTL formula φ, it holds
thatw |= φ iff φw → φ is valid.
In fact, as such φw we may choose the formula wf(w).
3.3 Non-omitting Workflows
We call a workflow non-omiing iff for each of its blocks
forall x¯ : s¯ [may]
θ1 → R1 ±= u¯1;
. . .
θn → Rn ±= u¯n
we have fv(u¯i ) = x¯ and θi is quantifier-free, for each i ∈ {1, . . . ,n}.
For a non-omiing workfloww , we can replace all existentially
quantified variables inside the Φb,R formulas by their respective
values, and remove the existential quantifiers. us, for any blockb ,
as all guards of b are quantifier-free, Φb,R becomes quantifier-free,
for all R ∈ Rwf . It follows that the formula wf(w) can be brought
into the ∃∗FOLTL fragment. Note that the thus simplified wf(w)
formula contains no existential quantifiers. Furthermore, all its
universal quantifiers are either not under a temporal operator (in
the case of the init(w) subformula) or under the G temporal op-
erator (in the case of the exec(w) subformula). erefore the sim-
plified wf(w) formula can be put in prenex normal form having a
quantifier prefix consisting of only universal quantifiers. As a side
remark, this means that ¬wf(w) can also be brought into ∃∗FOLTL.
Theorem 3.4. It is decidable for a non-omiing workflow w and
a formula φ in ∃∗FOLTL whether or notw |= ¬φ holds.
is means that if the set of all bad behaviors can be expressed
by a formula φ in ∃∗FOLTL, then absence of bad behaviors can be
checked for non-omiing workflows. e theorem follows from
eorems 3.3 and 2.1. Indeed, it is sufficient to check whether
wf(w) ∧ φ is unsatisfiable. is can be done, since both conjuncts
can be brought into ∃∗FOLTL, and thus the conjunction itself too.
e following theorem shows that the decidability result from
eorem 3.4 cannot be lied to arbitrary workflows.
Theorem 3.5. It is undecidable for a workflow w and a formula
φ in ∃∗FOLTL whether or notw |= ¬φ holds.
Proof. We prove the theorem by reducing the periodic tiling
problem to our workflow seing. e tiling problem was first men-
tioned in [31] and has first been shown undecidable by Berger
in [6]. Its closely related variant, the periodic tiling problems has
also been proven undecidable bymultiple authors— for an overview
see [20]. We now briefly recall the definition of the problem.
Given a set of k tile types T = {Ti | 0 ≤ i < k} as well as
horizontal and vertical compatibility relations x-comp ⊆ T × T
and y-comp ⊆ T × T , a tiling is a function f (x,y) : N × N → T
such that whenever two tiles are adjacent, they have to respect the
compatibility relations:
∀x,y. x-comp(f (x,y), f (x + 1,y)),
∀x,y. y-comp(f (x,y), f (x,y + 1)).
A tiling is periodic if there exist horizontal and vertical periods px
and py , such that
∀x,y. f (x,y) = f (x + px ,y),
∀x,y. f (x,y) = f (x,y + py ).
e periodic tiling problem is to find out for a given set of tile types
and its compatibility relations, if there exists a periodic tiling.3
Wewill now proceed to show how to encode this problem in our
workflow seing. We note that to find a periodic tiling, it is enough
to find the periods px , py , and the values f (x,y) for 0 ≤ x < px
and 0 ≤ y < py , such that they are also compatible at borders:
∀y. x-comp(f (px ,y), f (0,y)),
∀x . y-comp(f (x,py ), f (x, 0)).
We thus see a periodic tiling as a tablewith rows referring to points
on the y-axis and columns referring to points on the x-axis.
We build next a workflow w and a formula φ such that w |= φ
iff there is a periodic tiling for (T , x-comp,y-comp). We use the
following signature:
Σ =
(
{A}, {afirst ,alast }, {Q,Adj, Reach,T
′
0 , . . . ,T
′
k−1}, ar
)
Intuitively, time points refer to the rows of the tiling, while agents
refer to its columns. We explain next the role of the constant and
relation symbols. e k unary relations T ′i , with 0 ≤ i < k , are
used to encode the tiling function as follows: if T ′i (aj ) holds at
time point t , for some particular agent aj , then the tiling function
is f (t , j) = Ti . How the agent aj is determined is explained later.
ere are two constant agents afirst and alast which are used to
name the first and last row of the tiling. e nullary relation Q
encodes the last column of the tiling. e predicate Adj(a,a′) ex-
presses that the row named by a′ is directly below the row named
by a. Only Reach is a workflow relation; thus, initially (i.e. at time
point 0) it is empty. ere is a single sort, the agent sort A.
We let w be the following workflow. It is used to compute all
reachable parts of the adjacency relation Adj starting from the ini-
tial agent afirst :
forall. true → Reach += (afirst)
loop (*)
forall a,a′. Reach(a) ∧ Adj(a,a′) → Reach += (a′)
To encode the rest of the tiling requirements, we use a conjunc-
tion of ∃∗FOLTL formulas, where i, j implicitly range over the ele-
ments in {0, . . . ,k − 1}:
3e original formulation used just a single period p in both directions. We use in-
dependent periods to have less complicated constructions. We note that given a pe-
riodic tiling t with periods px and py it is easy to construct a periodic tiling t
′ with
p′x = p
′
y = (px ∗ py ). e original problem also did not consider compatibility rela-
tions, but edges of the same color. Again this makes our constructions easier and is
easily transformed into a solution of the original seing.
All agents always have exactly one tile assigned at each point in
time (Eqs. (1) and (2)).
G∀a.
∨
i
T ′i (a) (1)
G∀a.
∧
i,j
T ′i (a) → ¬T
′
j (a) (2)
A time point will be reached state where Q holds (Eq. (3)) and it
will only hold once (Eq. (4)).
X FQ (3)
G (Q → XG¬Q) (4)
Two adjacent time points need to be assigned x-compatible tiles
(Eq. (5)). Also, the right border of the tiling should be x-compatible
to the le, i.e. the time point where Q holds should be compatible
to the starting time point (Eq. (6)).
∀a. G (
∨
i, j : x -comp(Ti ,Tj )
T ′i (a) ∧ XT
′
j (a)) (5)
∀a.
∨
i, j : x -comp(Ti ,Tj )
T ′j (a) ∧ F
(
Q ∧T ′i (a)
)
(6)
Two adjacent agents need to be assignedy-compatible tiles (Eq. (7)).
e last agent should be reachable from the first via Adj relations.
We cannot express this fact in pure ∃∗FOLTL, so we will use the
relation Reach computed by the workflow (Eq. (8)). e last agent
should also be y-compatible to the first (Eq. (9)).
G∀a,a′. (FAdj(a,a′)) →
∨
i, j :y-comp(Ti ,Tj )
T ′i (a) ∧T
′
j (a
′) (7)
FReach(alast ) (8)
G (
∨
i, j :y-comp(Ti ,Tj )
T ′i (alast) ∧T
′
j (afirst)) (9)
Let φ be the conjunction of Eqs. (1) to (9). Note that φ can be
brought in ∃∗FOLTL. We show next thatw |= φ iff there is a peri-
odic tiling for (T , x-comp,y-comp).
Let S¯ ∈ JwK such that S¯ |= φ. We construct a tiling as fol-
lows. As S¯ satisfies the formula (8) and the formulas encoding
the first and second blocks of the workflow, it follows that there
is a sequence (t0, . . . , tn) of time points with n > 0 and t0 = 0,
and a sequence (a0, . . . ,an) of elements of the universe such that
a0 = afirst , an = alast , Reach(ai ) holds at time point ti , for all i with
0 ≤ i ≤ n, and Adj(ai ,ai+1) holds at time point ti , for all i with
0 ≤ i < n. en, we set px to the time point where Q holds and py
to n. For 0 ≤ t < px and 0 ≤ j < py , let f (t , j) beTi iffT
′
i (aj ) holds
at time point t . It is easy to see that f satisfies the compatibility
relations and that any given tiling can be transformed into a model
of φ. 
4 HYPERPROPERTIES
In this section, we show how to formalize and verify security prop-
erties of workflows. We focus on non-interference properties [17],
which are hyperproperties [10]. To specify such properties we use
the first-order extension of HyperLTL [9] presented in [16]. Hyper-
LTL can relate multiple traces and it is thus well suited to express
not only trace properties, but also hyperproperties. e first-order
extension is needed in the presence of an unbounded number of
agents. Furthermore it allows for more fine-grained policies.
4.1 HyperFOLTL
For presenting the syntax and semantics of the logic, we follow [16].
Syntax. Let Σ = (S,C,R, ar) be a signature, and let Π be a set
of trace variables disjoint from the set V of first-order variables.
Let RΠ = {Rπ | R ∈ R,π ∈ Π} and Σ
′
= (S,C,RΠ, ar
′) be the
signature with ar ′(Rπ ) = ar(R), for any R ∈ R and π ∈ Π.
HyperFOLTL extends FOLTL as follows. HyperFOLTL formulas
over Σ and Π are then generated by the following grammar:
ψ ::= ∃π . ψ | ¬ψ | φ
where π ∈ Π is a trace variable and φ is a FOLTL formula over Σ′.
Universal trace quantification is defined as ∀π .ψ := ¬∃π .¬ψ . Hy-
perFOLTL formulas thus start with a prefix of trace quantifiers con-
sisting of at least one quantifier and then continue with a subfor-
mula that contains only first-order quantifiers, no trace quantifiers.
As for FOLTL, a formulawithout free first-order and trace variables
is called closed.
Semantics. e semantics of a HyperFOLTL formulaψ is given
with respect to a set T of temporal structures, a valuationα : V →
U of the first-order variables, and a valuation β : Π → T of the
trace variables. e satisfaction of a HyperFOLTL formula ψ , de-
noted by T ,α , β |= ψ , is then defined as follows:
T ,α , β |= ∃π . ψ iff T ,α , β[π 7→ t] |= ψ , for some t ∈ T ,
T ,α , β |= ¬ψ iff T ,α , β 6 |= ψ ,
T ,α , β |= φ iff S¯,α |= φ,
where ψ is an HyperFOLTL formula, φ is an FOLTL formula, and
the temporal structure S¯ is such that for all R ∈ R , i ∈ N, and,
π ∈ Π, the interpretation RSiπ is R
β (π )(i ) if π in the domain of β ,
and ∅ otherwise.
A HyperFOLTL formula ψ is satisfiable iff there exists a set T
of temporal structures and valuations α and β s.t. T ,α , β |= ψ .
Example 4.1. Observational determinism [33] of programs can
be formalized by the following HyperFOLTL formula
∀π , π ′. (G∀x . Iπ (x) ↔ Iπ ′(x)) → (G∀y.Oπ (y) ↔ Oπ ′(y)),
where I (x) denotes that x is a low input to the program, whileO(y)
denotes thaty is a low output. e inputs and outputs are classified
as low or high with respect to the clearance level of some particu-
lar user. e formula states that, on any two program executions,
if the low inputs are always the same, then the low outputs are also
always the same. at is, from a low user point of view, the observ-
able behavior of the program is only determined by its inputs.
We will adapt this non-interference notion to the workflow set-
ting in Section 4.2. We refer to [9] for the formalization in Hyper-
LTL of other hyperproperties.
Decidability. We will consider the fragment of HyperFOLTL,
named ∃∗π∀
∗
π∃
∗FOLTL, that consists of all formulas of the form
∃π1, . . . πk . ∀π
′
1 . . . π
′
ℓ
.φ with k ≥ 0, ℓ ≥ 0, and φ an FOLTL for-
mula in ∃∗FOLTL.
We first remark that by seeing trace variables as first-order vari-
ables of a new sort T — the trace sort, HyperFOLTL formulas can
be faithfully encoded by FOLTL formulas. By this we mean that,
for any closed HyperFOLTL formula ψ , there is a closed FOLTL
formula φ such that we can translate models ofψ into models of φ
and vice-versa. e formula φ is obtained by replacing trace quan-
tification Qπ to first-order quantification Qπ :T , for Q ∈ {∃,∀},
and predicates Rπ (u¯) with predicates R
′(π , u¯). Note that ψ and φ
are formulas over slightly different signatures. e translation be-
tween models is straightforward. For instance, if S¯ is a temporal
structure that satisfiesφ, then the corresponding set T of temporal
structures that satisfiesψ consists of temporal structures obtained
by projecting a predicate’s interpretation on the predicate’s non-
trace arguments, for each of the values of the trace universe UT
of S¯, i.e. T = {S¯t | t ∈ UT } and R
St, i = {a¯ | (t , a¯) ∈ R′S¯i }, for
each R ∈ R , t ∈ UT , and i ∈ N.
As a consequence of the previous discussion, and as a corollary
of eorem 2.1, we obtain the following results.
Theorem 4.2. e following statements hold.
(1) Every HyperFOLTL formula can be translated into an equi-
satisfiable FOLTL formula.
(2) Satisfiability of formulas in ∃∗π∀
∗
π ∃
∗FOLTL is decidable.
Workflow satisfaction. A workflow w satisfies a closed for-
mula HyperFOLTL ψ , denoted w |= ψ , iff JwK,α , β |= ψ for the
empty assignments α and β .
Theorem 4.3. Let w be a workflow and ψ a HyperFOLTL for-
mula. en the following statements hold.
(1) An FOLTL formula ψ ′ can be constructed in polynomial
time so thatw |= ¬ψ iffψ ′ is unsatisfiable.
(2) If w is non-omiing and ψ is in ∃∗π∀
∗
π∃
∗FOLTL, then it is
decidable whether or notw |= ¬ψ holds.
Proof. Assume ψ has the form Q1π1 . . .Qkπk .φ, where the
trace quantifiers are partitioned into a set E of existential quan-
tifiers and a set A of universal quantifiers. en w |= ¬ψ is equiv-
alent with the validity of the following HyperFOLTL formula
Q¯1π1 . . . Q¯kπk .
( ∧
Q¯i ∈E
wf(w)πi
)
∧
(( ∧
Q¯i ∈A
wf(w)πi
)
→ ¬φ
)
,
where wf(w)π is wf(w) with each predicate symbol R replaced by
the predicate symbol Rπ , and Q¯ is ∃ if Q is ∀ and vice-versa. e
formula ψ ′ is then the FOLTL encoding of the following Hyper-
FOLTL formula
Q1π1 . . .Qkπk .
( ∧
Qi ∈A
wf(w)πi
)
→
(( ∧
Qi ∈E
wf(w)πi
)
∧ φ
)
.
Fromeorem 4.2, to prove the second statement, it is sufficient
to show that the previous HyperFOLTL formula, which we callψ1,
can be brought in the ∃∗π∀
∗
π ∃
∗FOLTL. By assumption, we have
that the trace quantifier prefix ofψ1 is of the form ∃
∗
π∀
∗
π and that
φ is in the ∃∗FOLTL fragment. Also, sincew is non-omiing, then
both wf(w) and ¬wf(w) can be brought in the ∃∗FOLTL fragment,
as remarked in Section 3.3. us all conjuncts in the following
FOLTL formula can be brought in the ∃∗FOLTL fragment
( ∧
Qi ∈A
¬wf(w)πi
)
∨
(( ∧
Qi ∈E
wf(w)πi
)
∧ φ
)
is means that the formula itself can be put into ∃∗FOLTL and
thusψ1 can be brought into ∃
∗
π∀
∗
π∃
∗FOLTL. 
4.2 Non-interference in workflows
As we have defined it, the workflow keeps track of the state of
all relations of all agents. However, security policies are meant to
allow access to classified information to just some of the users of
the system while denying it to others. For this, we need to specify
how an agent interacts with the workflow and reason about his
knowledge and possible interactions with the system.
In the running example, members of the PC can use a confer-
ence management system to specify conflicts, read the reviews that
other members have provided, provide their own reviews, etc. As
an example property, we will formalize that no member of the PC
gains any information about papers that he declared a conflict of
interest with.
Following [16], we present a variant of non-interference suitable
for these properties on workflows by adapting the notion of ob-
servational determinism from Example 4.1 to explicitly take into
account the knowledge and behavior of participating agents.
Non-interference in general is a strong specification of the valid
information flows in a system. It uses a classification of all inputs
and outputs to a system into “high” security and “low” security
inputs [17]. In our seing, these notions of input and output are
specific to an agent and his interactions with the workflow. input
to model a’s interactions with the workflow. We call a workflow
non-interferent, iff for any agent a, his observations do not depend
on the inputs which are “high” for a in any way.
AgentModel. It has been observed in [16], that non-interference
in workflows can only reasonably be argued about, if meaningful
assumptions on the behavior of agents are provided.
In order to specify such assumptions, we make the convention
that in any relation recording an agent’s knowledge or interac-
tion, this agent appears in the first argument of the relation. For-
mally, we classify all sorts into agent sorts and data sorts. More-
over, we require that the arity (s1, s2, . . . ) of every relation R ∈
Rwf ∪Rlow∪Rhigh is non-nullary and is such that s1 is an agent sort.
is restriction, while not strictly necessary, allows us to present
the results in this section in a much cleaner way.
An agent provides observable input to the workflow system by
choosing to execute (or to not execute) may-blocks for specific
data. Such input is low input, formalized through the predicates
Choice ∈ Rlow . e property that at a given time point, all low
inputs for a given agent a are equal on traces π , π ′ is formalized
as:
same low inputsπ ,π ′(a) :=∧
Choice∈Rlow
(
∀x¯ . Choiceπ (a, x¯) ↔ Choiceπ ′(a, x¯)
)
,
where, for each Choice predicate, the sequence x¯ has the same
length as its arity minus 1. Input provided by the environment is
considered high input. It is formalized through predicatesOracle ∈
Rhigh.
An agent can observe all tuples in which it is mentioned in the
first argument. e property that, at a time point, all observations
of a given agent a are the same on two given traces π and π ′ is
formalized by the following formula:
same observationsπ ,π ′(a) :=
∧
R∈Rwf
(∀x¯ .Rπ (a, x¯) ↔ Rπ ′(a, x¯))
Agent Behavior. e behavior of the workflow as seen by one
of the agents, depends on the actions of all other agents. If agents
have the power to behave arbitrarily, there will be spurious coun-
terexample traces to confidentiality where an agent chooses to let
his actions depend on confidential data — which he could not even
access. Here, we consider two meaningful agent models which re-
strict the behavior of agents across different executions.
e simpler agent model considers stubborn agents. An agent
is called stubborn if, even when told information that is confiden-
tial to another agent, he will not choose his actions depending on
this information. us, anyone observing the behavior of a stub-
born agent will not be able to conclude anything about confidential
data. Technically, this amounts to saying that his choices are inde-
pendent of the chosen trace. For a pair of traces π , π ′, the behavior
of a stubborn agent is therefore specified in HyperFOLTL by the
following formula:
stubbornπ ,π ′(a) := G same low inputsπ ,π ′(a)
Amore intricatemodel of agent behavior considers causal agents.
An agent is called causal if his actions may depend on his obser-
vations. As a result, a causal agent can subtly change his behavior
depending on the data that he gained access to. As an example, a
causal agent could indicate the acceptance of a paper to someone
else either by explicitly telling it to someone or by commenting to
another paper or refraining from it. For a pair of traces π , π ′, this
behavior is specified in HyperFOLTL by the following formula.
causalπ ,π ′(a) :=
same low inputsπ ,π ′(a)W¬same observationsπ ,π ′(a)
We remark that the causal agent model subsumes the stubborn
agent model and is less constraining on the behavior of the indi-
vidual agents, which leads to more intricate information flow vio-
lations.
We remark that the formula ∀a.causal(π , π ′, a) is not express-
ible in ∃∗FOLTL, as it has an ∀∃ quantifier structure. In case, how-
ever, that we consider a fixed upper bound on the number of causal
agents, the corresponding formula is in the ∃∗FOLTL fragment.
For instance for at most two agents, we can use the following for-
mula:
∃a1, a2. causalπ ,π ′(a1) ∧ causalπ ,π ′(a2)
Considering an upper bound on the number of causal agents is
a realistic seing, as it allows to verify the system for aacks by
coalitions up to a given size.
Declassification. In general, all external input data to thework-
flow, i.e. all relations in Rhigh are considered as high input. How-
ever, it oen needs be possible that an agent can learn something
about the high input data, depending on the scenario. is is also
apparent in the conference management example. ere, it is nec-
essary for a reviewer to be able to read at least some reviews, namely,
the reviews for papers he himself is assigned to— although reading
these might be illegitimate for others.
To model declassification, we assume a formula φOracle for each
relation Oracle in Rhigh. is formula encodes a declassification
condition that describes which Oracle tuples represent declassified
information, for any given agent. Initial high inputs for a therefore
should only be equal on traces π , π ′ if they are declassified for
agent a. Technically, this property is formalized by:
same declassified high inputsπ ,π ′(a) :=
G
∧
Oracle∈Rhigh
∀y¯.
(
(φOracle,π (a, y¯) ∨ φOracle,π ′(a, y¯))
→ (Oracleπ (y¯) ↔ Oracleπ ′(y¯))
)
By the notation φOracle(a, y¯) we mean that the free variables of the
formula φOracle are among the variables a and those in y¯. For our
running example, we use φOracle(a,x,p, r ) := ¬Conf(a,p).
Control Flow. e structure of the control flow graph and the
current position of the workflow (i.e. the state of all relations
in Rcfg) are considered as low input. is serves the intuition that
the non-determinism in the workflow is resolved by some external
control. For instance, the PC chair of the conference management
system may terminate the submission loop. is assumption is for-
malized by the following formula:
same pathsπ ,π ′ := G
∧
n∈Rcfg
nπ ↔ nπ ′
Putting it all together. Assume that there are at most k ≥ 0
causal agents with all other agents being stubborn. Non-interference
with Declassification is then expressed in HyperFOLTL by the fol-
lowing formula:
∀π , π ′.
(
∃a1, . . . ,ak .
( k∧
i=1
causalπ ,π ′(ai )
)
∧
(
∀a. (
k∧
i=1
a , ai ) → stubbornπ ,π ′(a)
))
∧ same pathsπ ,π ′
→ ∀a. noninterferentπ ,π ′(a)
where noninterferentπ ,π ′(a) :=( (
G same low inputsπ ,π ′(a)
)
∧
same declassified high inputsπ ,π ′(a)
)
→ G same observationsπ ,π ′(a).
Example 4.4. Coming back to the workflow in Example 3.1, we
check if the non-interference property holds.
Table 1: A counterexample to non-interference.
block relation π π ′
(b1) Conf (a1,p1)
(b2) Assign (a1,p2), (a2,p2), (a2,p1)
(b3) Review
(a2,p1, r21)
(a2,p2, r22) (a2,p2, r22)
(b4) Read
(a1, a2,p2, r22) (a1,a2,p2, r22)
(a2, a2,p2, r22) (a2,a2,p2, r22)
(a2, a2,p1, r21)
(b5) Review (a2,p2, r21)
(b4) Read
(a1, a2,p2, r21)
(a2, a2,p2, r21)
When all agents are stubborn, we find that non-interference is
satisfied for the given workflow. is result indicates that there
is no way for any agent to learn confidential information without
having a conspirator helping him.
e result is different when there is at least one causal agent.
In this case we find the following counterexample: Assume two
PC members a1 and a2 where a1 is stubborn and a2 is causal. e
non-interference property is stated for a1. ere are two papers
p1 and p2. First, a1 declares a conflict with p1, so in the rest of the
workflow he should not be able to observe a difference between
two executions of the workflow, regardless of which reviews p1 re-
ceives. Both agents get assigned top2. In addition, a2 gets assigned
top1 and writes a review for it. At this point, a2 can observe at least
one review for p1, so he can deviate his behavior on the two exe-
cutions. e next step is the discussion phase. In the first step, a2
reads all reviews of p1. In the next step, a2 adjusts his reviews of
p2 to mirror the reviews of p1. en, in the next iteration, a1 will
read the differing reviews ofp2 and learn about the result ofp1, the
paper he initially declared a conflict with.
Table 1 formalizes the counterexample. It shows the tuples that
are added to the updated relation aer the execution of each block.
Note that the workflow updates only one relation per block and
there are no removals. e reviews for p2 cannot differ (in the two
traces) directly aer the execution of the block (b3) since the de-
classification condition states that tuples in Oracle can only differ
when they are of the form (x,p1, r ). However, as a2 can observe
his own reviews for p1, his choices can start to differ aer (b3) is
executed; concretely, they will differ when block (b5) is executed.
In the last two rows, any value for r (except r22) would result in
a counter-example; we use r21 to suggest that a2 could simply re-
place its review forp2 with the review forp1. is aack represents
someone copy-pasting his review for the wrong paper into one of
his reviews.
We note that for the given specification of theworkflow, such an
aack is unavoidable in “real life”, as it can be performed also out-
side the workflow system. Concretely, a2 can directly communi-
cate the reviews for p1 to a1 through any communication channel,
for instance by email. To combat this aack, the example should
be changed to having disjunct reviewing groups — whenever a re-
viewer r is assigned to a paper p, no one else that has a conflict
with the other assigned papers of r can be assigned to p.
4.3 Verification
As hinted in Section 4.1, given a non-omiing workflow w and
an ∃∗π∀
∗
π∃
∗FOLTL formulaψ denoting a set of bad behaviors, our
approach for checking whether w |= ¬ψ consists in checking the
(un)satisfiability of the formulaψ ′ given in the proof ofeorem 4.3(1).
As an instance of this approach, we obtain that Non-interference
with Declassification can be checked on non-omiing workflows.
Theorem 4.5. For any non-omiing workflow, it is decidable to
check whether it satisfies Non-interference with Declassification for
a finite number of causal agents and an unbounded number of stub-
born agents, as long as for each formula φ expressing a declassifica-
tion condition, the negation normal form of ¬φ contains no existen-
tial quantifier.
It is easy to check that the negation of non-interference can be
brought into ∃∗π∀
∗
π∃
∗FOLTL. en, as w is non-omiing, the re-
sult follows directly from by eorem 4.3(2).
In [16], the authors show that for workflows without loops, it is
possible to check non-interference even when all agents behave in
a causal way. is is no longer the case for workflows with loops:
Theorem 4.6. e problem of checking for a given non-omiing
workfloww wether it satisfies Non-interference with Declassification
for an unbounded number of causal agents is undecidable, even if for
all formulas φ expressing a declassification condition, the negation
normal form of ¬φ contains no existential quantifier.
Proof. As in the proof foreorem 3.5, we present a reduction
from the periodic tiling problem. We will consider a workflow w
over signature Σ with
Σ =
(
{A}, {afirst}, {Q,O,Obs,Adj,T
′
0 , . . . ,T
′
k−1}, ar
)
where A, afirst ,Q , andT
′
0 , . . . ,T
′
k−1
are as in proof for eorem 3.5,
and they fulfill the same purposes. e Adj symbols denote again
a vertical adjacency relation, but here it is not filled with input
data, but rather computed stepwise by the workflow. e relation
denoted byO and Obs contain an initial secret that differs on both
traces and spreads along the adjacency relation Adj. e symbols
Q,T ′0 , . . . ,T
′
k−1
denote again high-input relations containing input
data with a declassification of true (i.e. they are always equal in
both traces).
We consider the following workflow:
forall . Oracle(afirst) → Obs += (afirst)
loop (*)
% Information flow from a to b
forall a,b may. true → Adj += (b,a)
% Clear Adj
forall a,b . Adj −= (a,b)
We add the rest of the tiling requirements to the declassification
condition of O , so that there only is an information flow violation
in case that all formulas hold.
As we again use time as the x-axis, we reuse Eqs. (1) to (6). We
also use alast as one representative agent of the boom-most row,
so we reuse Eq. (9) to specify that alast is compatible to afirst . is
time alast is not part of the signature, but wewill call the outermost
agent of the non-interference condition alast , so all declassification
conditions can use the variable.
Two adjacent agents need to be assigned y-comp tiles (Eq. (10)).
∀a,b . (FAdj(b,a)) → G
∨
y-comp(i, j)
T ′i (a) ∧T
′
j (b) (10)
e last agent should be reachable from the first via Adj relations.
is is expressed by specifying that alast can observe different tu-
ples on traces π , π ′ (the non-interference property.). Let ψ be the
conjunction of equations Eqs. (1) to (6) and (10). Let the declassifi-
cation conditions be:
φOracle = ¬ψ , φQ = true, φT ′i
= true
We then verify the non-interference property
∀π , π ′, alast .∀a , alast . causalπ ,π ′(a)
→ noninterferent(π , π ′, alast)
(11)
ere exists a satisfying model for the negation of the property
in Eq. (11) onw iff there is a periodic tiling for (T , x-comp,y-comp).
If alast observes different low outputs (tuples in Adj), either he is
the same agent asafirst andy-compatible to himself or there exists a
chain of causal agents spreading the tuples alongAdj to alast . Since
afirst is the only one able to read Oracle, every possible differences
can only originate in Obs. us, there is a chain of y-compatible
causal agents ai starting with afirst that reaches alast . We can con-
struct the tiling from any satisfying model in exactly the same way
as in the proof of eorem 3.5. 
5 EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
We have implemented our approach into the toolNIWO.4 Our tool
takes as input the specification of a workflow together with declas-
sification conditions and the number of causal agents. From that,
it generates a sorted FOLTL formula whose satisfiability is equiva-
lent to the existence of a violation of the non-interference property.
For non-omiing workflows, this formula is further compiled into
an equi-satisfiable LTL formula to be checked by some of-the-shelf
LTL satisfiability solver. Currently, we use Aalta [23] for that pur-
pose. e NIWO tool is, to our knowledge, the first implementa-
tion of an automated verification approach for workflows.
5.1 Size of the formulas
We consider the structure and size of the formulas whose unsatis-
fiability is checked in order to establish whether non-interference
holds for a given workflow. Such a formula is a conjunction with
four conjuncts. One conjunct is a universally quantified formula
that describes the semantics of the workflow (see Section 4.3). e
next conjunct represents the agent model and it is an existentially
quantified formula with the number of quantifiers matching the
given upper bound on the number of causal agents. e third
conjunct represent the assumption on the control flow and it is
a propositional formula. e last conjunct describes the existence
of a counterexample to the non-interference property and it is an
existentially quantified formula. When considering only stubborn
agents, for a workflow with observable relations of maximum ar-
ity ns per sort s , the formula to be checked for unsatisfiability uses
4e source code together with all examples can be found on the authors’ website.
∑
s ns existential quantifiers. Every existentially quantified vari-
able adds one Skolem constant to the smallest universe (for its sort)
that can be considered. As described in the proof of eorem 2.1
universal quantification over a sort is translated into a conjunc-
tion over all Skolem constants of that sort.5 us, the resulting
encoding of the universally quantified conjunct is exponential in
the number of existentially quantified variables of each sort. For
every causal agent considered,
∑
s ns additional existential quanti-
fiers are added to the formula. Since every causal agent adds multi-
ple existential quantifiers, the resulting LTL formula can be orders
of magnitude larger when considering multiple causal agents of
the same sort.
5.2 Experiments
We evaluated NIWO on realistic example workflows, among these
the example from the introduction, as well as synthetic examples
to evaluate scalability issues.
We used several realistic examples. Notebook is an event-based
model of a notebook-like data structure where several people can
write messages, but everyone can only read his own data. It is
proven safe by our implementation, even in the presence of causal
agents. Conference is the example conference management from
Example 3.1, where our implementation finds the counterexample
described in Section 4.3. Conference-acceptance is a slight varia-
tion that forgoes reviews and replaces it by an acceptance relation.
Since it is very similar to the initial conference example, we use
it to showcase the impact of small changes to the workflow to
the verification problem. Conference-linear is the motivating ex-
ample used in [16]. It is a simpler version of the Conference exam-
ple, which does not use loops, and exhibits a very similar aack.
University is an example from a university environment where a
professor writes down secret grading information for students. It
takes at least 2 conspiring agents for a student to learn something
about grades of other students.
Additionally, we used synthetic examples to illustrate the scal-
ability of the approach in several dimensions. e Fixed-Arity-X
examples show the behavior when increasing the number of rela-
tions. ese cases contain X relations that are successive copies
of each other starting from some secret input. e Fixed-Arity-X-
safe examples are similar, but are devoid of counterexamples. e
Sorted-Increasing-Arity-X and Increasing-Arity-X examples show
the impact of using sorts. ey containX relations of arities 1, . . . ,X ,
respectively. For every relation of arity n, a tuple containing the
first n − 1 variables has to be present in the relation with arity
n − 1. For the Increasing-Arity cases, all variables refer to the same
sort, whereas in the Sorted-Increasing-Arity variant, every relation
of arityn uses n different sorts. causal-X and Sorted-causal-X cases
showcase the scalability with the number of causal agents that are
part of the aack. ese cases are set up in a way that a successful
aack needs to consist of at least X causal agents.
5.3 Results
e results of the experiments are shown in Table 2. e first col-
umn describes the number of causal agents that are considered.
5Note that, nevertheless, sorts may greatly reduce the number of conjuncts in com-
parison to the unsorted case.
All other participating agents are considered as stubborn as per
Section 4.
e size of the workflow is the number of blocks the workflow
consists of, not counting choice and loop constructs. e result
is safe iff the LTL formula was proven unsatisfiable by Aalta and
unsafe otherwise. e next column gives the sizes of the consid-
ered universes. For example, to show that Conference is safe with
respect to one causal agent, it is enough to consider universes con-
taining 4 reviewers, 2 papers and 2 reviews (one per paper), re-
spectively. e universes’ sizes are given as a tuple, for instance
(4, 2, 2). e size of both the FOLTL and LTL formulas is the num-
ber of nodes in the formulas abstract syntax tree. e last column is
the time (in seconds) that it takes Aalta to check the satisfiability
of the LTL formula (averaged over 10 runs). All experiments were
carried out on a desktop machine using an Intel i7-3820 clocked at
3.60 GHz with 15.7 GiB of RAM and running Debian with a time-
out of 20 minutes.
e implementation is able to handle all examples based on real
applications in less than 100 seconds. Even though the size of the
resulting formula is exponential in the number of agents in the
universe,Aaltawas still able to check the satisfiability of formulas
consisting of thousands of LTL operators in reasonable time. As
expected of a satisfiability solver, giving a counterexample for a
formula is almost always faster than proving it unsatisfiable for
formulas of comparable complexities.
e Fixed-Arity cases show that workflows handle an increasing
number of relations with the same arity quite well. Here, adding
another relation increases the size of the formula by a small fac-
tor, since the size of the needed universe stays the same - only the
universally quantified encoding of the control flow graph grows.
Increasing the necessary arity of the relations increases the mini-
mum size of the universe - as shown by the Increasing-Arity cases.
In case that all necessary agents are of the same sort, the formula
grows exponentially, whereas it grows a lot slower in case that in-
creasing the arity introduces a new sort. Since in those cases the
size of the needed universe is exactly one agent per sort, the result-
ing LTL formula is even smaller than the FOLTL specification. e
biggest factor in increasing the state space of the workflow, how-
ever, is the number of necessary causal agents as shown by the two
variants of the Causal-X cases. Since every causal agent that we
consider adds another copy of all of the agents needed to verify the
workflow for only stubborn agents, adding the first causal agent
doubles the minimum amount of agents in the universe. Since the
size of the LTL formula is exponential in the number of agents,
adding more causal agents causes the size of the resulting LTL for-
mula to grow rapidly.
6 RELATED WORK
e closest work to ours is [16] where a similar workflow lan-
guage is introduced. at language, however, does not provide
control-flow constructs such as loops. Accordingly, a bounded
model checking approach suffices to verify hyperproperties such
as non-interference. In presence of loops, boundedmodel checking
does no longer suffice for that purpose.
e workflow model that we consider is a type of a multi-agent
system. Another type of multi-agent systems is represented by
Table 2: Experiment Results
Name # causal agents Workflow size Result Universe size FOLTL size LTL size Time (s)
Notebook 0 2 safe (1,1) 266 240 0.18
Notebook 1 2 safe (3,2) 309 993 2.92
Conference 0 5 safe (2,1,1) 628 1089 2.50
Conference 1 5 unsafe (4,2,2) 700 8771 91.86
Conference-acceptance 0 5 safe (2,1) 628 1089 2.47
Conference-acceptance 1 5 unsafe (4,2) 700 5187 45.63
Conference-linear 0 4 safe (2,1) 469 698 0.75
Conference-linear 1 4 unsafe (4,2,1) 541 4116 4.91
University 0 3 safe (1,1) 305 202 0.01
University 2 3 unsafe (4,3,3,2) 408 2727 1.28
Fixed-Arity-10 0 10 unsafe (2) 1928 5299 0.89
Fixed-Arity-15 0 15 unsafe (2) 3963 11114 3.09
Fixed-Arity-20 0 20 unsafe (2) 6723 19054 16.85
Fixed-Arity-10-safe 0 10 safe (2) 1924 5283 33.40
Fixed-Arity-15-safe 0 15 safe (2) 3959 11098 158.83
Fixed-Arity-20-safe 0 20 safe (2) 6719 19038 740.91
Increasing-Arity-2 0 2 safe (2) 180 335 0.08
Increasing-Arity-3 0 3 safe (3) 301 2206 6.20
Increasing-Arity-4 0 4 safe (4) 451 21894 -
Sorted-Increasing-Arity-2 0 2 safe (1,1) 180 163 0.03
Sorted-Increasing-Arity-3 0 3 safe (1,1,1) 301 270 0.09
Sorted-Increasing-Arity-5 0 5 safe (1,1,1,1,1) 630 559 0.40
Sorted-Increasing-Arity-10 0 10 safe (1,. . . ,1) 1960 1719 8.97
Causal-1 0 4 safe (2) 654 1129 8.23
Causal-1 1 4 unsafe (4) 747 2805 6.05
Causal-2 0 6 safe (2) 778 1353 26.73
Causal-2 2 6 unsafe (6) 965 6338 195.31
Sorted-Causal-2 2 3 unsafe (4,3,1) 378 1184 1.47
Sorted-Causal-3 3 4 unsafe (5,4,4,1) 598 3169 1.96
Sorted-Causal-5 5 5 unsafe (7,6,6,6,6,1) 1197 14510 17.05
business processes. ey are oen described by BPMNdiagrams [12]
and formalized by Petri nets. A business process is a collection of
activities, and a workflow thereof represents the flow of data items
between activities. Activities are performed by users, who may
need to synchronize on certain actions, but otherwise execute ac-
tivities asynchronously. is is contrast to our formalism, where
workflow steps are executed synchronously by a set of agents. In-
formation flow in business processes has been considered, e.g., in [4].
ere the MASK framework for possibilistic information flow se-
curity [26], and in particular a variant of the unwinding technique
from [17], is used to prove that specifications satisfying particular
constraints are safe. Up to our understanding, the approach is not
easily amenable to automation.
ere have recently been many efforts to verify concrete work-
flow systems, such as conference management systems [2, 21] or
an eHealth system [7], or a social media platform [5]. For instance,
the CoCon conference management system [21] is implemented
and checked in the interactive theorem prover Isabelle. Its se-
curity model uses a specialized non-interference notion (based on
nondeducibility [30]), which ismotivated by the need for fine-grained
declassification conditions. In our case, this need is satisfied by
the use of FOLTL, which allows for specifying fine-grained de-
classification conditions both in the “what” and in the “when” di-
rections [28]. ConfiChair [2] is a cryptographic-based model of a
cloud-based conference management system for which the strong
secrecy (also a hyperproperty) of paper contents and reviews is
automatically checked with the ProVerif tool. In contrast to these
works, which focus on the verification of one specific system, we
propose a modeling language for workflow, together with a verifi-
cation approach.
Another aempt to verify parametric systems via a formaliza-
tion in first-order logic is the CSDN language [3]. at language
has been proposed for describing and verifying the semantics of
controllers in soware-defined networks (SDNs). With our work-
flow language, it shares that the semantics is specified in terms of
relations. A CSDN program consists of a sequence of controller
rules, each guarded by an event paern. When the event paern
fires, the corresponding command is executed. Commands are ex-
pressed in a simple imperative language, which allows to query
and update relations. In contrast, the basic step of our workflow
language is the forall block, which consists of a sequence of guarded
updates to relations. is sequence is executed in parallel for each
instantiation of the block variables. Accordingly, the semantics
in [3] and the one in the present paper are orthogonal, and can-
not easily simulate one another. Furthermore, in contrast to [3],
we are not only interested in plain invariants, but temporal non-
interference properties expressed by HyperFOLTL.
Expressing trace properties with sorted FOLTL has been initi-
ated already in the work of Manna and Pnueli [25] and logic-based
approaches are now standard in the verification of such proper-
ties. Logic-based approaches for non-trace properties are less com-
mon and include the ones based on epistemic temporal logics [14],
SecLTL [13], and in particular HyperLTL [9], the logic whose first-
order extension we use in this paper.
7 CONCLUSION
Wehave provided an extension to theworkflow language from [16]
with non-deterministic control-flow structures. We have encoded
the semantics of theseworkflows aswell as complex non-interference
properties into sorted FOLTL and identified a fragment of sorted
FOLTL where satisfiability is decidable. From that, we concluded
that non-interference is decidable for non-omiing workflows and
a fixed number of causal agents. ese methods are strong enough
to automatically construct aacks to the example property.
We also explored in how far our decidability result can be fur-
ther generalized. We found, however, that dropping either the
restriction on workflows or the bound on the number of causal
agents results in undecidability.
We have implemented the toolNIWOwhich automatically veri-
fies sorted non-interference properties for non-omiingworkflows.
We evaluated our implementation on workflows inspired by a con-
ference management system. Nonetheless, we would like to see
specifications of larger workflows in order to beer understand
the potentials and limitations of our methods.
A practical verification system for arbitrary workflows in our
language requires to deal with the satisfiability problem of general
(sorted) FOLTL formulas. Clearly, FOLTL is a fragment of FOL—
using one unary function symbol. It remains for future work to
explore in how far current automated theorem provers such as
Spass [32] or Z3 [11], or model-finders such as Alloy [19] or its
temporal extension Electrum [24] are able to deal with the non-
interference formulas for workflows; or what extra proving tech-
nology is required.
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